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Abstract
Intimate partner violence (IPV) is a pervasive issue affecting 1 in 3 women worldwide. Despite the negative
welfare impacts, it is still seen as acceptable in some parts of the world, even amongst women. This paper examines
how elastic these accepting attitudes towards IPV are to changing economic conditions. Specifically, this paper
focuses on changes in intra-household resources from negative shocks to male-sourced income. The setting and
context takes place in coastal communities in Indonesia, where fishing is a main source of income generated primarily
by men. This paper uses satellite-derived fishing conditions to measure how women's attitudes towards IPV change
when the husband experiences an income shock. I find that when fishing conditions go from high to low, women's
acceptance of IPV decreases significantly. This effect is driven by women who participate in the labor market, and
especially amongst poorer households. These results suggest that as women's share of household income increases,
the acceptance of IPV amongst women goes down. This implies that expanding income opportunities, and closing
the gender wage gap, can lead to positive women's empowerment outcomes.
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I. Introduction
Intimate partner violence (IPV) is one of the most common forms of violence against
women. It refers to any behavior within an intimate relationship that causes physical,
psychological or sexual harm to those in the relationship (WHO, 2012). Worldwide
approximately 1 in 3 women who have been in a relationship have experienced IPV (WHO, 2013).
IPV has short and long-run negative health outcomes. It is associated with adverse
outcomes to physical and mental health, such as depression, suicide, miscarriage, fetal injury and
others (Van Paryset al, 2014; Dubbury,et al, 2013). In addition, psychological distress from
domestic violence can cause a decline in labor productivity and loss of wages, with consequences
on children’s health and education (Centers for Disease Control, 2003). Despite the negative
outcomes of IPV, 43% of women in a globally representative survey, state that IPV is an
acceptable action (Anttila-Hughes et al., 2016). This range of acceptance varies across countries,
but is seen to be systematically higher in poorer countries (Jayachandra, 2014).
Attitudes towards IPV, defined as the propensity to accept (or willingness to accept) IPV,
is one of many domains of gender norms that are closely related with development. If the gender
norms are such that in certain situations a woman's freedom and capabilities are constrained by
the threat of violence with impunity, then understanding how these norms change can lead to
pareto efficient outcomes. In addition, accepting attitudes towards IPV is a high risk factor of
actual occurrences of IPV since the lack of social sanctions reduce the social costs of the action
(Gelles, 1983). Studying attitudes towards IPV can thus give a better idea of the prevalence of
IPV, which often goes underreported due to social desirability bias (Sugarman and Hotaling,
1997).
Attitudes towards IPV, and gender norms more generally, are outcomes conditional upon
various factors. For instance, they can be deeply-rooted in historical context, such as ancient
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agricultural practices that created a gendered division of labor (Alesina, 2013), or they can be
elastic, changing with socioeconomic conditions (Anttila-Hughes, et al, 2016). IPV is a unique
sort of violence against women because it occurs within the household. Despite this, not much
has been done that explores how women's attitudes towards IPV change when intra-household
resources are shifted within the household.
In this paper, I will be looking at how fluctuations in gender-specific income sources affect
women's willingness to accept IPV. The context will be Indonesian coastal communities where
households engage in fishing as a main source of income. In Indonesia, as in most countries,
fishing is a male-dominated industry and is vulnerable to environmental conditions. I use remote
sensing satellite imagery to measure local fishing conditions over time as a plausibly exogenous
measure of male-sourced income. Low fishing conditions correspond with less income. Given the
exogenous nature of the oceanographic variables used to measure these fishing conditions, we
can identify how attitudes towards IPV change when women's income increases relative to her
husband's.
My results show that when fishing conditions are low, women's willingness to accept IPV
under any stated reason decreases. In addition, attitudes towards IPV amongst employed women
are far more elastic to changing fishing conditions than unemployed women; and employed
women see a drastic reduction in acceptance when fishing conditions go from high to low. These
results suggest that as women's relative income compared to her husband's increases, she is less
willing to accept violence. This is consistent with non-cooperative bargaining household models,
as well as empirical evidence that has documented how reduction in the gender wage gap has
reduced IPV in more developed countries. These results also suggest that attitudes towards
intimate partner violence are not as rigid as they are believed to be, and that changing economic
circumstances can improve women's empowerment.
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Section II of this paper will go over the contextual background of Indonesia's fishing
industry and gender roles; Section III will review the literature on gender norms and how they
are related to intra-household bargaining models, along with empirical evidence. Section IV will
go over the data used in this analysis. Section V will cover the methods used in this analysis; and
section VI will cover the empirical results.

II. Contextual Background
a.) Indonesia Fishing Industry
Indonesia is the third largest fishing nation by quantity produced and is a major exporter
of fish in the global market (FAO, 2013). The fishing industry contributes to over 21 percent of
Indonesia’s agricultural economy, 3 percent of national GDP, and provides over six million
people with direct employment. Marine fishery captures correspond to the majority of fishery
production, with over half of total captured fish being small pelagic fish.
Small pelagic fish comprise a diverse group of fish that inhabit the upper surface layers of
the water column above the continental shelf, and form schools that feed mainly on plankton.
These species are very sensitive to environmental conditions and their abundance is highly
seasonal. In Indonesia, and the rest of Southeast Asia, small pelagic fish dominate the share of
fish catch (Lymer et al, 2008).
Marine fishing consists of traditional fishing and commercial fishing. Traditional fishing
consists of small vessels with trips that are very short, lasting only one to two days, and very
close to shore. This type of fishing is primarily done for subsistence in small fishing households.
Several studies that document subsistence livelihoods in Indonesia have highlighted that
fishermen experience the highest variability in income. Due to the seasonal nature of the
profession, income is highly variable with fishermen having really high income when times are

5

good, and struggling to put food on the table when conditions are bad (Sugiyanto, Kusumastuti,
and Donna, 2012).
b.) Indonesia Gender Roles
Gender roles in fishing has been very well documented in fishing communities around
the world (Matthews, 2012). In Indonesia, fisherwomen (wives of fishermen) have separate
income generating activities from the men that help to cope with low income during the low
seasons of fishing. Fauzi and Anna (2016) find that many women work extra hours when there
is a low fishing season, usually as part-time housemaids for families in the higher income groups
within the coastal area. Women typically do not participate directly in fishing activities, but are
involved with processing activities and sales. This role in the post-harvest phase has been
documented in other parts of the world where women are independent entrepreneurs with a
strong hold on the fish trade (Bene, 2008). In some parts of the country, women are not allowed
to participate in any way in fishing activities because of local taboos (Matthews, 2012).
According to Nurmila (2013), ethnic beliefs in Indonesia consider males as the leaders of
the households and the sole breadwinners, and women as caretakers in the household. She
emphasizes that many women contribute to the economic well-being of the family, as many are
even the “bread-winners”. However, because of the stereotype of male-headed households, women
are not recognized for their role. These ethnographic documentations of gender norms in
Indonesia largely motivates this study, and make Indonesia a unique setting to test how elastic
these norms are to changes in intra-household resources.

III. Literature Review
a.) Long-term Persistence of Gender Norms
This paper fits into a body of work that looks at how gender norms can change over time.
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Gender norms are thought to be the outcome of socioeconomic factors from the past that have
persisted over time. For instance, Alesina et al. (2013) find that the gender inequality that we see
today in certain parts of the world have historical roots in the division of labor of traditional
agriculture. The authors find evidence that in areas where the labor force historically demanded
workers with a comparative advantage in physical strength (such as plough agriculture, hunting,
and fishing) contemporary gender roles developed to be more unequal compared to areas with
socioeconomic arrangements that made women more economically valuable (Alesina et al. 2016).
Standard models of cultural evolution suggest that gender norms can persist even after the
economy transitions out of agriculture since they often become embedded in the institutions and
generally accepted as heuristics, or "rules-of-thumb" (Boyd and Richerson, 1985).
Inter-generational transfers of gender norms have been found to exist that support that
gender norms persist. In India, children whose parents hold more discriminatory attitudes
towards women are more likely to hold those same views (Dhar et al., 2016). Evidence of maleskewed sex ratios amongst US residents of East Asian and South Asian origin indicate that these
intergenerational transfers can persist even if economic conditions change (Almond, 2008;
Abrevaya, 2009). These findings suggest that gender norms can be rigid through time and
inelastic to changing economic environments.

b.) Gender Norms and Intra-household Bargaining Power
Although gender norms do persist to some degree, they can still be malleable, and can
change depending on the context. These include sectoral changes that increase the labor
productivity of women (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1996; Pitt et al., 2012). For instance, Qian (2008)
studies economic reform in China in the late 1970s that proliferated the growth of cash crops.
She posits that women have a comparative advantage in picking tea leaves, which are delicate,
and men have an advantage in picking fruit, due to their larger stature and upper body strength.
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She finds that areas where the economic reforms increased the production of tea-leaves, and thus
the labor productivity of women, had less male-skewed sex ratios. This indicates that women's
intra-household bargaining power increased as her share of household income increased, and this
resulted in changes in fertility preferences.
Qian's results are consistent with collective bargaining household models (Browning and
Chiappori, 1998; Lundberg, 1996; Bourguignnon, 2009; McElroy and Horney, 1981; Lundberg
and Pollark, 1994). These collective models are divided into two categories- cooperative, and
non-cooperative. Cooperative bargaining models assume that each member of the household has
his or her own set of preferences, and that members allocate resources in a pareto efficient way.
Distributional factors, or bargaining power, in the household are primarily influenced by threat
points, defined as the utility a member would get outside of the marriage. The higher the value
of outside options, the more bargaining power the household member has. Factors that affect
threat points include extra-household environmental parameters, such as divorce laws, better
labor market opportunities, and outside support options (Voena, 2015). Non-cooperative
bargaining models relax the assumption of pareto efficiency implying that multiple Nash
Equilibria may exist within the household that relate to history and culture.

c.) Intra-household Bargaining Power and IPV
Non-cooperative bargaining models have been used to model IPV, which is the focus of
this study. Tauchen et al. (1991) models IPV as an instrument for both control, and direct utility
for the husband. The level of violence is largely determined by the woman's threat point, or the
opportunity cost of the wife staying in the marriage. If threat points increase such that her utility
is higher if the marriage dissolves, then the husband will be forced to reduce the level of violence
in order to preserve the marriage. Aizer (2010) models IPV as decreasing as women's relative
wages, and potential wages, increase. This is due to her bargaining power increasing as her
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outside options improve. Such assumptions are contrary to "male backlash" theories from
sociology that assert that inequality of resources can increase the risk of IPV due to status
inconsistencies (Atkinson et al, 2005, Macmillan and Gartner, 1999; Vyas et al., 2009). However,
these theories ignore the individual rationality constraints faced by women in abusive
relationships. Indeed, Aizer finds that the reductions in the gender wage gap explains nine
percent of the decline in IPV witnessed in California between 1990 and 2003.
The response towards resource inequality within the household in poorer countries could
be different than in wealthier countries, since women's outside options could be more constrained.
In African countries, female employment, and intra-household inequality in education has been
shown to be associated with more IPV. This may be due to the possibility that outside options
are not binding enough for her to leave the marriage. This is especially true if women live in
areas with a high level of acceptance of wife-beating (Cools and Kotsadam, 2015). However, this
is cross-sectional and correlative. Randomized roll outs of gender-targeted cash transfer
programs give a better picture of this relationship because they show outcomes from exogenous
increases in resources controlled by women. Evidence shows that women who are beneficiaries
of a randomized cash transfer program experience less physical violence (Bobonis et al, 2009).
Interestingly, violent threats increase which indicate that men do still attempt to extract rents
from the women. This has been found to only occur for women with more than primary education
(Hidrobo and Fernald, 2011).

c.) Intra-household Bargaining Power and Attitudes Towards IPV
The relationship between attitudes towards IPV, intra-household bargaining power, and
resources has been studied only recently but do suggest that attitudes of IPV are not static, and
do fluctuation with economic conditions (Tolonen, 2014). The study closest to mine is AnttilaHughes et al. (2016) who looks at a global DHS dataset of women from 38 developing countries,
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and documents substantial intra-annual variation in stated attitudes towards IPV. The authors
find that plausibly exogenous changes in economic well-being associated with negative rainfall
shocks, are associated with a significant increase in the willingness to accept violence by women.
The contribution of this paper is to focus on whether the temporal variation in stated
attitudes found in Anttila-Hughes et al. (2016) could be driven by changes in intra-household
resources. Just as Qian (2008) finds that household fertility preferences change as the share of
income from the woman increases, this paper will see how increasing women's share of household
income affects their willingness to accept IPV. I will be using satellite derived fishing conditions
as a gender-specific measurement of income variation, described below.

d.) A View from Above
In order to study the effect of intra-household resources on attitudes towards IPV, I use
fishing conditions that are derived from satellite imagery. The use of remote sensing satellite
imagery has become an increasingly important tool for economic analysis (Donaldson and
Storeygard, 2016). In particular, it allows for the intersection of disciplines that make it possible
to explore relationships between social and natural sciences.

The fishing conditions

measurement used in this analysis is based strictly on a marine biology literature that has found
that satellite imagery can be used to determine fish abundance, distribution, and growth in a
given area (Semedi and Dimyati, 2009). In particular, oceanographic variables such as Sea Surface
Temperature, and chlorophyll-a concentration have been found to be highly correlated with the
abundance, distribution and growth of pelagic fish (Semedi et al., 2016). Chlorophyll-a
concentration provides information about the amount of phytoplankton in a location which is the
base of the ocean food web and thus the primary food source of all small pelagic fish. SST is
important because it determines the development and survival of eggs.
In Indonesia, Semedi and Hadiyanto (2013) find that catch per unit of effort is highly
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correlated with chlorophyll-a concentrations, and sea surface temperature, with max catch per
effort occurring in areas where the chlorophyll-a concentrations were between 0.3 mg/m3 and
2.8 mg/m3; and where sea surface temperature was between 26 degrees C and 30 degrees C
together. These oceanographic factors are influenced by factors that are exogenous to
socioeconomic factors. For instance, the growth of plankton is largely due to the nutrients in the
water that are determined by environmental processes such as upwellings. These are when ocean
currents bring cold and nutrient rich water from the bottom of the ocean to the surface (NASA
Earth Observatory, 2013). Because of this exogeneous nature, studies have used satellite derived
fishing conditions to measure socioeconomic outcomes such as crime (Fluckiger and Ludwig,
2015). Axbard (2016), for instance used the same specifications of chlorophyll-a concentration
and sea surface temperature to construct fishing conditions that were used to measure the effect
of income opportunities and sea piracy in Indonesia. He finds that when fishing conditions go
from low to high, the price of fish decreased by 10%, the income of fishermen increased, and
ultimately sea piracy decreased by 40%. These results form the primary assumption made in this
paper that low fishing conditions results in low income for fishermen.

IV. Data
a. Constructing Fishing Conditions
The measurement that will be using to measure fishing conditions, and thus income, will
be based on Axbard (2016). The remote sensing products used in this method is derived from the
NASA MODIS Aqua satellite and consists of a global grid layer of sea surface temperature and
a global grid layer of chlorophyll-a concentrations. Both are available monthly from July 2002 to
June 2013 at a 0.05° spatial resolution (which corresponds to about 4km x 4km grid cells). The
fishing conditions measure is constructed by overlaying both global grid layers of chlorophyll
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concentration and sea surface temperature, and creating a new grid layer that takes the value of
one if the sea surface temperature grid cell is between 26 and 30 ° Celsius AND if the overlaid
chlorophyll-a concentration grid cell is between 0.3 and 2.8 mg/m3. This is illustrated by the
following expression:

(1)

𝐹𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡, =

1 𝑖𝑓 26 ≤ 𝑆𝑆𝑇, ≤ 30 ∩ 0.3 ≤ 𝑐ℎ𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑦𝑙𝑙, ≤ 2.8
0

The final grid cell layer will be binary with grid cells equal to one if it is a good fishing
cell based on the specification from the marine science literature, and zero if it is not a good
fishing cell (see Figures 1 and 2).
To construct local fishing conditions that could be merged in with household data, a 50
nautical mile area was designated off the coast of each coastal district. The fishing conditions
variable is then calculated by taking the sum of the number of good fishing cells as a share of the
total number of grid cells within that 50 nm area associated with each district. This then creates
a normalized measure of local fishing conditions that is the share of total number of "good fishing
grid cells" within the 50 nautical mile coastal district area. Equation 2 illustrates the method of
calculating the fishing conditions variable for each district, d. The main treatment variable used
in our specifications will be a dummy variable that indicates whether fishing conditions are below
the median, classified as bad, or above the median, classified as good. Equation 3 shows how the
main treatment variable is constructed- that is, it is a dummy variable equal to one if the fishing
conditions for district, d, is below the historical median:

(2)

𝐹𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠? =

H
I @ABC

DEFGB

JFGKL MNA? OPLLB QAGCAR KR ST RU KNPK
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For Indonesia, the average fishing conditions is 0.22; that is, on average, 22% of the grid
cells within a 50 nautical mile coastal district area are on average good fishing spots. This
fluctuates by month, with high fishing conditions occurring in the months of June until
August/September. The main treatment variable used in our specifications will be a dummy
variable that indicates whether fishing conditions are below the median, classified as bad, or
above the median, classified as good.

1 𝑖𝑓 𝐹𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 < 𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛

(3)

𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝐹𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 =
0 𝑖𝑓 𝐹𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 > 𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛

b. Attitudes Towards Intimate Partner Violence
The attitudes towards IPV data comes from the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS)
of Indonesia for the years 2002, 2003, 2007, and 2012. The DHS which is a global survey of
women that collects socioeconomic, health, fertility, and gender empowerment data for the use
of analysis and policymaking.
The 2002-2003 round of the DHS covered around 18,000 women respondents across the
country between the months of October 2002 to April 2003. The 2007 wave covered around
20,000 individuals between July and December, and the 2012 covered around 26,600 between
May, and December. Pooled together, these two waves give me a sample of 62,712 individuals.
The women respondents are asked during the survey whether they think it is justified if
a husband beats their wives under a number of situations and circumstances. These include if: a)
the wife goes out without telling them, b) the wife neglects the children, c) the wife argues with
the husband, d) if the wife refuses to have sex with the husband, and e) if the wife burns the food.
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Figure 4 shows the percent of respondents in the sample that state that the respective reasons
are acceptable. In the pooled sample, around 35% of the respondents said that beating was
justified under at least one of the situations at the time of survey, with this ranging between 20%
and 65% across provinces (Figure 5). Since these attitudes are stated, it is not certain that the
respondents perfectly correlate with actual attitudes. To address this, the DHS practices the gold
standard of surveying, which utilize well-defined questions and a strict privacy protocol that
emphasizes anonymity.
The DHS includes employment data for the husbands and the wives with the occupations
categorized based on the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics’ codes. In our sample, about 65% of
women are employed. Sales, and agricultural work are the main occupations for women, with
27.25%, and 31.76% of employed women in each respectively. In addition, male’s earnings are
more than women in every occupation category. In sales and agriculture in particular, males earn
more than females 82% and 98% of the time respectively. This data is only for the 2012 DHS, but
it is reasonable to assume that 2002-2003, and 2007 have around the same proportion, or even
higher due to positive trends in the gender gap in wages. Unfortunately, these occupation
categories are very vague and it is not clear which category that fishing is placed under. One way
to narrow down the sample and increase the chances of capturing fishing households in our
sample, I rely on qualitative evidence that documents how the majority of fishing households are
small, subsistence households (Sugiyanto, Kusumastuti, and Donna, 2012). For this I look at the
DHS household wealth index. The wealth index is a composite measure of a household’s
ownership of selected assets. These include televisions and bicycles, materials used for housing
construction, and types of water access and sanitation facilities. This index is broken down into
deciles with 1 being the poorest, and 5 being the richest. I will be defining households in the
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bottom two wealth quintiles as poor households and those at the top three quintiles non-poor
households which will be used in our analysis.

V. Methodology
In order to estimate the effect of changes in intra-household resources on attitudes
towards domestic violence, I use a linear probability model with the following specifications:

(4)

𝑉A?U^ = 𝛽T + 𝛽a 𝑓?U^ + 𝚩𝑋 + 𝛿 + 𝛾 + 𝜃 + 𝜇A?U^
H0 : 𝛽a = 0
HA: 𝛽a < 0

The sample will only look at coastal districts, which is defined as a district with a coastline.
The dependent variable, V, is a dummy variable that is equal to one if respondent i living in
coastal district d in month m and year y, states that it is acceptable for a husband to beat their
wife in at least one situation listed in the previous section. The variable 𝑓?U^ is a dummy variable
that is equal to one if fishing conditions are bad, defined as being below the historical median at
that time. X is a vector of controls that include age, highest education level, employment, wealth,
and whether the respondent lives in a rural area or not.
In order to control for time-invariant characteristics that may bias the effect of the treatment,
I use province-level fixed effects, month fixed effects, and year fixed effects, 𝛿, 𝛾, 𝜃 respectively.
This fixed effects model will give me the within-estimator of the effect of bad fishing conditions
on attitudes towards domestic violence. For instance, province fixed effects will control for the
fact that geographic location could influence fishing conditions, so certain areas would
systematically have higher fishing conditions on average than others.
15

Conditional upon fixed effects, the main identification strategy is that fishing conditions is
not endogenous to other demographic and household characteristics that could confound the
estimate. This is due to these conditions being determined through oceanographic variables such
as chlorophyll-a concentration and sea surface temperature. The main hypothesis that this
analysis is making is that as a women's relative share of household income in the household
increases, their attitudes towards IPV should become less accepting. If local fishing conditions
are poor, then the wife’s relative share of the household income goes up, thus her bargaining
power goes up and her acceptance of IPV goes down. I further estimate this effect with the
following specification:

(5)

𝑉A?U^ = 𝛽T + 𝛽a 𝑓?U^ + 𝛽i Employed + 𝛽r 𝑓 x Employed 𝚩𝑋 + 𝛿 + 𝛾 + 𝜃 + 𝜇A?U^
H0 : 𝛽r = 0
HA: 𝛽r < 0

In this specification, Employed is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the respondent is
employed and has a source of income, and 𝑓𝑥𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑 is an interaction term that interacts
whether the woman is employed or not, and the dummy variable for bad fishing conditions. The
estimates of each coefficient will be in relationship to the omitted category, which here is
unemployed women when there are good fishing conditions. The coefficient b1 will show the
change in acceptance for unemployed women when fishing conditions go from good to bad. The
coefficient b2 will show the difference in acceptance between employed and unemployed women
when fishing conditions are good; and b3 will capture the change in employed women's
willingness to accept IPV when fishing conditions go from good to bad. This last coefficient is
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our coefficient of interest and our hypothesis is that it is negative. That is, when fishing
conditions go from good to bad, women who are employed become less willing to accept IPV.
Since the sample is likely heterogeneous, it is important to test whether the fishing conditions
are endogenous with other climatic variables that could change the economic conditions of the
household. For example, although fishing conditions are plausibly exogenous to household
characteristics, they may correlate with broader climatic variables that could affect agriculture.
As a robustness check I will control for confounding agricultural spillovers by looking at rainfall
variables.

VI. Empirical Results
a.) Fishing-related Income Shocks and Attitudes Towards IPV
This section presents the results of equation 1, which tests our hypothesis that low fishing
conditions reduce women's willingness to accept IPV. Again, fishing conditions are our
measurement for income generated by fishermen. When conditions are low, husbands bring
home less income, and this would make women less willing to accept IPV from them. Figure 6 is
a semi-parametric graph showing the relationship between violence acceptance and the fishing
share variable conditional upon household demographic controls, as well as province, year, and
month fixed effects. We see that fishing conditions have a positive relationship with the
acceptance of IPV. As fishing conditions improve, the willingness to accept IPV increases; or
conversely, if fishing conditions decline, willingness to accept IPV decreases.
Table 1a reports the OLS results of attitudes against the main treatment variable that
indicates below median fishing conditions. The coefficient for below median fishing conditions is
negative and statistically significant across all specifications. Comparing columns 1 and 2, we see
that including the control variables does not change the coefficient by much in terms of size or
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relationship, which is evidence that fishing conditions are plausibly exogenous to demographic
and household characteristics. Taking the coefficient of column 4 which is conditional upon
province, year, and month fixed effects, it's shown that when fishing conditions go from above
the median to below, the probability that a woman respondent states that IPV is acceptable
decreases by 3.7 percentage points. This effect is large considering it is a 10% change from the
sample mean. Each specification includes DHS sample weights, and the standard errors are
clustered at the district level. Column 5 relaxes the assumption of a linear relationship between
below median fishing conditions and the dependent variable by using logit specification that
instead assumes a logistic relationship instead. The results remain consistent with the OLS
results, with the marginal effects showing a decrease of about 4 percentage points.
Figure 7 shows how fishing conditions affect the situational components of the attitudes
dummy variable. The negative relationship is consistent for each situation. The effect size is
largest for women who state that it is ok if a woman goes out without telling the husband with a
decrease of 3.2 percentage points. Seeing a decrease in acceptance in this situation is a sign that
women feel more free to pursue what they wish to do when their husband does not bring home
enough income. Seeing a decrease in the acceptance of arguing against the husband situation is a
sign that women feel more empowered to stand up to her husband if he does not provide.
Neglecting children may be a sign that the husband should also look after the children; and
refusing sex is a sign that the woman feels the right to deny the husband pleasure if he does not
provide. Each estimate corresponds to roughly a 10% change from the sample average of each.
The results also show that women's age at the time of interview, and increasing wealth
quintiles are negatively related to acceptance which is consistent with the existing literature
(Anttila-Hughes et al., 2016). Interestingly, I find that the more educated the respondent is, the
more accepting she is of IPV. This result is not found in global DHS studies, meaning this could
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be unique to Indonesian schooling institutions. I also find that employed females are more
accepting of IPV than women who are not employed. This may be in line with the relative
resource theory where women with more resources are at higher risk of a male-backlash due to
male status inconsistencies. Despite this, it may be the case that employed women are more
responsive to exogenous changes in the husband's income.

b.) Intra-household Resources and Attitudes Towards Intimate Partner Violence
The results of the previous section showed that lower fishing-related income reduces
attitudes towards IPV. This section tests the second hypothesis that women who are employed
are more responsive to such changes. Women who participate in the labor market bring home
income for the family. If fishing conditions are low, then the husband's share of household income
would be reduced, leaving the wife as the main provider during this time. In addition, this section
will also test whether this heterogeneity between employed and unemployed women is further
differentiated between poor and non-poor households. There are two reasons why this might be
the case. One reason is that fishing is primarily done by small-holder households. By only looking
at poor households it is likely that the sample has a higher share of fishing households, reducing
the noise associated with having households that do not fish. Additionally, poorer households are
plausibly more vulnerable to income shocks than non-poor households since they do not have as
much capacity to smooth consumption.
Figure 8a shows a semi-parametric graph of fishing conditions for employed and
unemployed subsamples. We see in the graph that fishing conditions do indeed have
heterogeneous effects amongst employed and non-employed women. In particular, the
willingness to accept IPV is much more elastic amongst employed women, with lower fishing
conditions associated with lower acceptance. For unemployed women, the relationship is highly
inelastic, with virtually no relationship. Figure 8b shows how employed women respond to

19

fishing conditions if they are in poor versus non-poor households. Interestingly there is
heterogeneity even amongst employed women, with the willingness to accept IPV more elastic
in the poor sub-sample compared to the non-poor subsample. Again, this is expected since it is
likely that this subsample captures a higher share of fishing households, as well as households
with lower adaptive capacity to shocks.
In order to quantify the heterogeneous effect of bad fishing conditions amongst employed
and unemployed women, I estimate equation 2 and present the results in table 2. The coefficients
of table 2 are associated with the fishing condition variable, the employed variable, and the
interaction between the two. Each of these coefficients will be in relation to the omitted group
which is above median fishing conditions and unemployed women. The coefficient for Employed
will give the partial effect of being employed when there are good fishing conditions; the
coefficient for Below median fishing condition will give the partial effect of when fishing conditions
go from good to bad when the woman is unemployed; and the coefficient for Below Median Fishing
Conditions x Employed will give the partial effect of being employed when fishing conditions go
from good to bad.
Comparing the coefficient for "Employed" and the interaction in column one in the full
sample, we see that women who are employed are on average more accepting of IPV when
conditions are good, and this acceptance is reduced when conditions go from good to bad. This
coefficient though is not statistically significant and I cannot reject the null that there is any
change. However, when the sample is restricted to include only poor households, the willingness
to accept IPV amongst employed women is drastically reduced when fishing conditions go from
good to bad. Additionally, we see from the first estimate that there is no change in acceptance
amongst unemployed women, when fishing conditions go from good to bad in both samples. This
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may be due to unemployed women now contributing to the share of household income, or that
she is still dependent on the husband.

c.) Climate Control Robustness Checks
Since our sample is likely to be heterogeneous, it is important to test whether the fishing
conditions variable is not endogenous with broader climatic variables that could influence
agriculture. For this, accumulated rainfall at the month of survey, and the month prior to the
survey, is used. If the fishing conditions are endogenous with these climatic variables, then not
including them would bias our results. In particular, if fishing conditions also correspond with
more rainfall, then the fishing income hypothesis is cofounded by there also being agricultural
income effects. Table 3 displays the results of including the climate controls in with the results
of equation 2. Column 2 shows that including these rainfall variables does not change our
estimates of interest which provides further evidence that fishing conditions exogenously affect
income through fishing.

V. Conclusion
This paper focuses on how changes in intra-household resources affect women's attitudes
towards intimate partner violence. I use exogenous variation in gendered income from satellitederived fishing conditions off the coast of Indonesia. By linking these with DHS household
surveys, I was able to see whether changes in husband's income affected women's attitudes
towards IPV. My results show that when fishing conditions are low, women's willingness to
accept intimate partner violence goes down significantly. This effect is driven by women with a
source of independent income from their participation in the labor force. When fishing conditions
go from good to bad, employed women are significantly less willing to accept IPV. This is in line
with the literature that show that:

21

a.) Attitudes towards IPV can be elastic to changing economic situations (Anttila Hughes
et al. 2016). When fishing conditions are bad, women are less willing to accept IPV.
b.) As women's relative income compared to the man's increases, she is less willing to
accept violence due to her outside options (Aizer, 2012). Attitudes towards IPV amongst
employed women are far more elastic to changing fishing conditions than unemployed women,
especially those in poor households.
c.) Like Qian (2008) increasing women's share of household income can lead to positive
women's empowerment outcomes. The willingness to accept IPV decreases amongst employed
women when the husband's income decreases.
Attitudes towards intimate partner violence, and gender norms more generally, are
outcomes of complex interactions between people, culture, and the institutions that they interact
with. The results of this paper show that they can also be elastic to changing economic
circumstances that are primarily driven by women's participation in the labor force. This also
serves as evidence that economic development, by expanding income opportunities and closing
the gender wage gap, can lead to positive women's empowerment outcomes (Duflo, 2012).
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Figures
Figure 1: Sea Surface Temperature and Chlorophyll-a Concentration

Figure 2: Global Fishing Conditions
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Figure 3: Fishing Conditions of Coastal Districts in Indonesia

Figure 4: Acceptance of IPV by Situation
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Figure 5: Acceptance of IPV by Province in Indonesia

Figure 6: Fishing Conditions and the Acceptance of IPV
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Figure 7: Bad Fishing Conditions and the Acceptance of IPV by Situation

Figure 8a: Attitudes Towards IPV in Employed and Unemployed Subsamples
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Figure 8b: Employed Women in Poor vs Non-poor Subsamples
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Tables
Table 1: Fishing Conditions and Attitudes Towards IPV.
Dependent Variable: 1= States that IPV is acceptable in at least one situation.

(1)

Below Median Fishing Conditions
Employed
Number of Children
Rural(1) Urban(0)
Age
Highest Education Level = 1, primary
Highest Education Level = 2, secondary
Highest Education Level = 3, higher
Wealth Quintile = 2, poorer
Wealth Quintile = 3, middle
Wealth Quintile = 4, richer
Wealth Quintile = 5, richest

Province FE
Year FE
Month FE
Constant

(3)
(4)
Violence Acceptance
Ordinary Least Squares
-0.037** -0.033** -0.039** -0.037**
(0.017)
(0.016)
(0.016)
(0.016)
0.022***
0.013*
0.013*
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.007)
0.008*** 0.011*** 0.011***
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
0.030** 0.032*** 0.033***
(0.012)
(0.012)
(0.012)
-0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006***
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
0.062*** 0.057*** 0.058***
(0.016)
(0.016)
(0.016)
0.087*** 0.069*** 0.069***
(0.019)
(0.019)
(0.019)
0.015
-0.009
-0.012
(0.024)
(0.024)
(0.023)
-0.005
-0.006
-0.006
(0.012)
(0.012)
(0.012)
-0.003
-0.003
-0.003
(0.013)
(0.013)
(0.012)
-0.039** -0.036** -0.036**
(0.015)
(0.015)
(0.014)
-0.066*** -0.054*** -0.054***
(0.018)
(0.017)
(0.017)
Y
N
N
0.334***
(0.013)

Observations
62,688
R-squared
0.042
Standard Errors Clustered at the District Level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(2)

(5)
Logit
-0.193**
(0.080)
0.066*
(0.035)
0.058***
(0.011)
0.162***
(0.059)
-0.028***
(0.002)
0.308***
(0.090)
0.355***
(0.103)
-0.066
(0.133)
-0.024
(0.055)
-0.005
(0.057)
-0.164**
(0.069)
-0.272***
(0.082)

Y
N
N
0.425***
(0.032)

Y
Y
N
0.419***
(0.039)

Y
Y
Y
0.327***
(0.037)

Y
Y
Y
-0.184
(0.241)

62,611
0.060

62,611
0.068

62,611
0.072

62,611
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Table 2: Employed Interaction.

(1)
(2)
Violence Acceptance
Below Median Fishing Conditions

-0.024
(0.020)
Employed
0.020**
(0.009)
Below Median Fishing Conditions x Employed
-0.016
(0.013)
Number of Children
0.011***
(0.002)
Rural(1) Urban(0)
0.033***
(0.012)
Age
-0.006***
(0.000)
Highest Education Level = 1, primary
0.059***
(0.016)
Highest Education Level = 2, secondary
0.070***
(0.019)
Highest Education Level = 3, higher
-0.008
(0.023)

-0.009
(0.022)
0.042***
(0.015)
-0.043**
(0.017)
0.010***
(0.003)
0.010
(0.018)
-0.006***
(0.001)
0.053***
(0.020)
0.079***
(0.023)
0.034
(0.041)

Constant

0.324***
(0.038)

0.405***
(0.047)

Y
Y
Y
N

Y
Y
Y
Y

62,611
0.071

29,584
0.078

Province FE
Year FE
Month FE
Poor Sub Sample
Observations
R-squared
Standard Errors Clustered at the District Level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3: Climate Controls Robustness Check

(1)
(2)
Violence Acceptance
Below Median Fishing Conditions

-0.009
-0.003
(0.022)
(0.021)
Employed
0.042*** 0.043***
(0.015)
(0.015)
Below Median Fishing Conditions x Employed -0.043** -0.046***
(0.017)
(0.017)
Accumulated Rainfall (m)
-0.055
(0.112)
Accumulated Rainfall (m) t-1
0.183
(0.114)
Number of Children
0.010*** 0.010***
(0.003)
(0.003)
Rural(1) Urban(0)
0.010
0.010
(0.018)
(0.018)
Age
-0.006*** -0.006***
(0.001)
(0.001)
Highest Education Level = 1, primary
0.053*** 0.053***
(0.020)
(0.019)
Highest Education Level = 2, secondary
0.079*** 0.079***
(0.023)
(0.023)
Highest Education Level = 3, higher
0.034
0.036
(0.041)
(0.042)
Province FE
Year FE
Month FE
Poor Sub Sample

Constant

Observations
R-squared
Clustered standard errors at District Level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y

0.405***
(0.047)

0.375***
(0.059)

29,584
0.078

29,550
0.078
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